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An Insurance Approach to Risk 
Management in the Ethanol Industry 
 
Nicholas D. Paulson, Bruce A. Babcock, Chad E. Hart, and 
Dermot J. Hayes 
 
 The vast majority of crop and revenue insurance policies sold in the United States are single-
crop policies that insure against low yields or revenues for each crop grown on the farm. But, 
increasingly, producer income is based more on the value of crops that have been converted 
into a value-added product such as ethanol. Moreover, the recent increases in energy and com-
modity price levels and volatilities emphasize the importance of risk management to ethanol 
investors. This paper uses an insurance approach to outline a risk management tool which 
mimics the gross margin level of a typical corn-based ethanol plant. The gross margin, pre-
mium, and indemnity levels are calculated on a per bushel basis to enable producers/investors 
to utilize the product based on their ownership share in the production facility. The fair pre-
mium rates are shown to be quite sensitive with respect to corn and energy price levels and 
volatilities. 
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Value-added enterprises, such as ethanol produc-
tion, have recently gained interest as tools that 
farmers can use to create new markets for their 
products. According to the Renewable Fuels As-
sociation (RFA 2007), there are currently more 
than 100 plants producing ethanol in 26 states in 
the United States.1 These facilities comprise a 
total production capacity of more than 5.5 billion 
gallons per year, nearly three times the production 
capacity in 2001. More than 80 plants, with the 
potential to double the production capacity in the 
United States, are reportedly under construction. 
In 2006, 4.9 billion gallons of ethanol were pro-
duced in the United States using nearly 1.8 billion 
bushels of corn, roughly 17 percent of total U.S. 
corn production (RFA 2007). 
 The majority of ethanol plants use corn as the 
feedstock in the production process, increasing 
demand for corn by creating new markets for 
corn producers. Generally, investors in ethanol 
production are required to provide an initial in-
vestment to purchase ownership rights in the fa-
cility and then receive premium payments based 
on plant profitability in addition to any payments 
they may receive for corn marketed to the plant. 
In the case of farmer-ownership, membership 
“shares” are often sold on a per bushel basis, po-
tentially tied to a designated delivery require-
ment, with premium payments made based on 
each producer’s proportion of ownership (share 
of total bushels processed). These new investment 
opportunities help to boost corn prices by en-
hancing demand through market creation. How-
ever, ownership in an ethanol production facility 
also exposes the investor to global and domestic 
energy market risk. 
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1 The vast majority of U.S. ethanol plants are concentrated in the 
Midwestern states of Iowa, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, and 
South Dakota. 
 In March 2005, the Chicago Board of Trade 
(CBOT) introduced one of the first market-based 
risk management tools designed specifically for 
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the ethanol industry in the form of a futures con-
tract for denatured ethanol. However, the short 
trading history of the ethanol futures has shown 
relatively low trading volumes2 and little price 
volatility relative to ethanol cash markets. More-
over, the market still lacks an exchange traded 
options contract on ethanol, further limiting the 
risk management options available to both plant 
managers and farmers invested in ethanol pro-
duction. 
 It is estimated that ethanol production in the 
United States will reach over 12 billion gallons 
by 2010, with ethanol prices declining over the 
same period, as growth in production outpaces 
demand (FAPRI 2007). Ethanol’s increasing de-
mand for corn is expected to lead to higher corn 
prices and to more acres being devoted to corn, 
an effect already being seen with an estimated 90 
million acres planted to corn in 2007. The dual 
effects of higher corn prices and lower ethanol 
prices will tighten profit margins in the ethanol 
industry and slow investment (Elobeid et al. 
2006). Moreover, high price volatility for both 
corn and ethanol are expected over the next few 
years as the industry continues to rapidly expand 
(Hart 2005). Therefore, the availability of effec-
tive risk management tools for the ethanol indus-
try is likely to become more important and valu-
able to ethanol investors and plant managers. 
 Farmers investing in an ethanol plant are em-
ploying a risk management strategy by diversify-
ing, similar to investing in livestock operations. 
Many farmers have also chosen to participate in 
crop insurance to protect their livelihood, in ad-
dition to adopting diversification strategies. The 
vast majority of crop and revenue insurance poli-
cies sold in the United States are single-crop poli-
cies that insure against low yields or revenues for 
each crop grown on the farm. But, increasingly, 
producer income is based more on the value of 
crops that have been converted into a value-added 
 
2 As of June 1, 2007, there have been a maximum of 966 (28 million 
gallons) contracts of open interest on the ethanol futures, with most 
trading days closing with 400–500 (11.6–14.5 million gallons) con-
tracts of open interest. Total trading volume in ethanol futures is also 
quite low and relatively sporadic, with 5–10 days of zero trading being 
rather common. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) also offered 
a corn-based ethanol futures contract that was traded on its Globex 
electronic exchange. However, in August of 2007, CME announced 
that it would be delisting its ethanol futures contracts as of September 
2007. This was attributed to low trading volumes, but could potentially 
be related to the recent merger between CME and CBOT to form the 
CME Group. 
product. Insurance against declines in the value-
added portion of the crop is limited; for example, 
agricultural producers can insure the relative fi-
nancial performance of livestock via products such 
as Livestock Risk Protection (LRP) and Live-
stock Gross Margin (LGM). Following a similar 
vein, this paper develops an insurance product/ 
risk management tool aimed at corn producers 
who are involved in ethanol production to insure 
against poor financial performance of the facility 
over a given time period. 
 The risks faced by an investor in ethanol pro-
duction include both output and input price vola-
tility in any single period as well as the narrowing 
of profit margins over time relative to the levels 
at which the investment decision was based. 
While the importance of the second longer-term 
source of risk should not be overlooked, the focus 
of this research is on the management of the risk 
created by price volatilities during a given time or 
production period. The use of the risk manage-
ment tool outlined in this paper is limited to the 
period for which coverage is provided. 
 To maintain the linkage with crop insurance, 
this tool is outlined for corn producers, but ar-
guably could be adapted for use by any ethanol 
investor and/or plant manager. By insuring against 
circumstances that cause low profits for ethanol 
plants, the product would provide value to its 
owner during periods of low premium payments 
from ethanol plants. The product mimics the 
gross margin level of a typical ethanol production 
facility that implements the dry-mill production 
process using corn as the feedstock. The gross 
margin, premium, and indemnity levels are calcu-
lated on a per bushel basis to enable producers to 
utilize the product based on how many bushels of 
corn they intend to market to the ethanol facility 
over the contract year. The fair premium rates are 
shown to be quite sensitive with respect to corn 
and energy price levels and volatilities. An his-
torical analysis is also included to assess potential 
performance of the policy. Finally, a brief discus-
sion of other risk management alternatives, in-
cluding the ethanol futures market, and some con-
cluding comments are provided. 
 
Contract Design 
 
Based on numerous sources (Bryan and Bryan, 
Inc. 2000, RFA 2007, Hart 2005, Elobeid et al. 
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2006), the dry-mill process converts corn into 
ethanol according to the following relationship: 
 
 Inputs 1.0 bushel (bu) of corn 
  0.165 million British thermal units (mmBtu) 
of energy (natural gas) 
 
 Outputs: 2.7 gallons of ethanol 
  17 pounds of distillers dried grains with solu-
bles (DDGS) 
 
Given the fixed-proportions technology, price 
risk in input and output markets is assumed to be 
relatively more important than any source of pro-
duction risk associated with the technology. How-
ever, while the technology outlined above charac-
terizes most all dry-mill ethanol plants, fixed and 
overhead cost structures will typically differ be-
tween facilities and regions. Therefore, our focus 
was on covering a gross margin index for a typi-
cal dry-mill plant rather than a measure of a net 
profit margin. 
 The policy was designed as an exotic Asian 
basket option, where the payout at maturity will 
equal the difference (if positive) between the 
value of an asset portfolio and a set strike value. 
Hart, Babcock, and Hayes (2001) used similar 
methods in developing various types of livestock 
revenue insurance products for cattle and hog 
producers. The policy was designed to insure the 
average gross margin of an ethanol production 
facility, per bushel of corn processed, over the 
life of the contract. 
 Expected commodity price levels and the fixed 
proportions technology determine the guaranteed 
level of gross margin according to 
 
(1) 
2.7* 0.0085*
0.165*
T t T t
t t
T t T t
ETHP DDGP
MarGuar E
CORNP NGP
>
> >
+⎡= ⎢− −⎣
. 
 
The operator Et denotes expectations at time t, 
MarGuart is the guaranteed (expected) level of 
the gross margin index ($/bushel) at time t, and 
ETHPT > t is the average ethanol price ($/gal) over 
the life of the contract ending at T > t. Similarly, 
DDGPT>t, CORNPT>t, and NGPT>t are the average 
DDGS ($/ton), corn ($/bu), and natural gas 
($/mmBtu) prices, respectively, over the life of 
the contract. 
 At the end of the contract year, the actual gross 
margin measure used for indemnification is calcu-
lated using equation (1) and realized futures set-
tlement prices throughout the contract year. For 
each commodity, the realized price levels would 
be calculated as the average settlement price over 
the settlement month for each contract throughout 
the year. In our example, the price levels used for 
each commodity in equation (1) would be taken 
as the simple averages of the settlement prices for 
each contract month. 
 At contract termination, contract owners re-
ceive an indemnity payment for each bushel in-
sured equal to 
 
(2) 
  [ ]max 0, * ,T T t TIndemnity CL MarGuar MarAct= −  
 
where maxT denotes the maximum operator taken 
at time T, CL is the elected coverage level, and 
MarActT is the realized level of the ethanol gross 
margin index at time T using the actual futures 
settlement prices in equation (1). The policy in-
sures against downward price movements in etha-
nol and DDGS prices and upward movements in 
corn and natural gas prices. As an illustrative ex-
ample, we structured the contract on an annual 
basis, assuming constant production throughout 
the year simply as an example. The methodology 
could easily be extended to different contract 
lengths or to place more weight on different peri-
ods throughout the life of the policy. 
 
Expected Price Levels 
 
Expected corn and natural gas prices were taken 
directly from the existing futures markets for 
these commodities [CBOT and New York Mer-
cantile Exchange (NYMEX)].3 Unleaded gasoline 
(NYMEX) and corn futures are used to proxy for 
the ethanol and DDGS price components of the 
margin guarantee, respectively. 
 DDGS is a type of feed ration additive used in 
many livestock industries as a substitute for corn. 
A monthly average DDGS price data series from 
Lawrenceburg, Indiana (USDA, Feed Outlook 
and Feed Situation and Outlook Yearbook), and 
average futures settlement prices for corn over the 
                                                                                    
3 All futures price data were obtained from www.barchart.com. 
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same period (1997–2006) were used to identify a 
relationship between corn and DDGS prices. The 
simple correlation coefficient for the DDGS and 
corn price series was equal to 0.70. The data se-
ries for DDGS and corn prices are plotted in Fig-
ure 1. The DDGS price data were regressed 
against the corn futures data using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) to estimate the following model: 
price series to estimate the following simple lin-
ear model: 
 
 
(3) , *t tDDGP CORNP= α +β + ε
 
where DDGPt is the DDGS price in month t 
($/ton), CORNPt is the corn price in month t 
($/bushel), and εt is a mean-zero error term. The 
intercept coefficient was not statistically signifi-
cant and restricted to equal zero. The slope coeffi-
cient for the restricted model was estimated to be 
39.17, implying that the value of DDGS is 
roughly 70 percent that of corn on a pound-for-
pound basis. The full set of regression results is 
reported in Table 1.4
 While an ethanol futures market does exist, the 
short trading history does not provide a reliable 
historical relationship with prices in the corn and 
natural gas markets, and low trading volumes 
coupled with growing concentration in the indus-
try could lead to potential moral hazard problems 
for the policy. Moreover, the lack of an ethanol 
options market restricted the use of ethanol fu-
tures for our purposes due to the lack of informa-
tion on ethanol price volatility. 
 Ethanol is used mainly as a fuel additive in 
unleaded gasoline to improve emissions and re-
duce dependence on non-renewable fossil fuels. 
Historically, there has been a strong relationship 
between ethanol and unleaded gasoline prices. An 
average monthly price series of ethanol and 
unleaded gasoline rack (wholesale) prices from 
Omaha, Nebraska [Nebraska Energy Office 
(NEO)], and unleaded gasoline futures settlement 
prices averaged over the settlement month were 
used to estimate the pricing relationship and are 
plotted in Figure 2. The NEO ethanol and un-
leaded price series had a simple correlation 
coefficient of 0.89. The ethanol price series was 
regressed against the unleaded gasoline futures 
 
t(4) *t tETHP UNLP= α +β +µ , 
 
where ETHPt denotes the ethanol price in month t 
($/gallon), UNLPt is the unleaded gasoline price 
in month t ($/gallon), and µt is a mean-zero dis-
turbance. The coefficient estimates, standard er-
rors, and the R2 value are reported in Table 1. 
Note that the regression results imply that whole-
sale ethanol in Omaha is priced at roughly 90 
percent the price of wholesale gasoline plus the 
federal tax credit ($0.51 per gallon). 
 Another alternative related to equation (4) 
would be to assume that ethanol is priced at its 
energy equivalent value of 67 percent of gasoline 
plus the federal tax credit of $0.51 per gallon. 
The energy equivalence approach has been used 
to model long-term outlooks for the ethanol and 
corn industries (FAPRI 2007, Elobeid et al. 2006). 
All of the following results are reported using the 
regression estimates from equation (4) reported in 
the final row of Table 1. However, we have also 
calculated all results using the energy equivalence 
approach. These results are quantitatively similar 
to those reported here and are available from the 
authors upon request. 
 To establish the margin guarantee in equation 
(1), expected price levels for all commodities 
were taken as the average of the relevant futures 
contract settlement price over the first five trading 
days in March of the contract year. For example, 
the expected price for corn in December of the 
contract year was taken as the average futures 
quote for the December corn contract over the 
first five trading days in March of the contract 
year. The expected price levels for corn and gaso-
line were used with equations (3) and (4) to cal-
culate predicted price levels for DDGS and etha-
nol, respectively. 
 Historically, unleaded gasoline futures have not 
always been traded out for a full year from the 
month of March. In years in which futures quotes 
were not traded a full year out, the crude oil mar-
ket was used to create synthetic unleaded gasoline 
futures. Oil futures historically have been traded 
over a full year out, with the historical monthly 
correlation between unleaded gasoline and crude 
oil futures settlement prices averaging 0.98. The 
4 Data covering alternative time periods and alternative regression 
specifications were also examined. The regression estimates were 
found to be robust for the period analyzed, and the simple linear form 
provided the best fit to the data. 
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Figure 1. Monthly Averages of DDGS and Corn Futures Settlement Prices (January 1997 
through December 2006) 
Source: Barchart.com (for corn). USDA (Feed Outlook and Feed Situation and Outlook Yearbook) (for DDGS). 
 
 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics for Regression Equations (3) and (4) 
Equation Dependent Variable Independent Variable 
∧α  (S.E.) 
∧β  (S.E.) R2
(3) DDGPt CORNPt 0.00 
(-) 
39.17 
(0.944) 
* 
(4) ETHPt UNLPt 0.54 
(0.050) 
0.90 
(0.042) 
0.78 
* The conventional R2 value is invalid when restrictions are imposed on the parameters. 
 
 
synthetic unleaded prices were calculated by tak-
ing the percentage change in the predicted crude 
oil price from one contract month to the next and 
extrapolating that change onto the expected price 
for gasoline. For example, in March 1997, the 
unleaded gasoline futures market was trading out 
through the December 1997 contract. The ex-
pected price for unleaded gasoline for the January 
1998 contract was calculated by extrapolating the 
percentage change in price from the December 
1997 to the January 1998 crude oil contract 
quotes. 
 Because the value of the policy is determined 
solely by futures contract prices and a fixed tech-
nology process, any moral hazard problem is 
minimized. Single agents do not have the ability 
to affect price levels and therefore cannot affect 
the likelihood of receiving payments. The fact 
 
56    April 2008 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
$0.25
$0.50
$0.75
$1.00
$1.25
$1.50
$1.75
$2.00
$2.25
$2.50
$2.75
$3.00
$3.25
$3.50
$3.75
De
c-9
6
Ju
n-9
7
Ja
n-9
8
Ju
l-9
8
Fe
b-9
9
Au
g-9
9
Ma
r-0
0
Oc
t-0
0
Ap
r-0
1
No
v-0
1
Ma
y-0
2
De
c-0
2
Ju
n-0
3
Ja
n-0
4
Au
g-0
4
Fe
b-0
5
Se
p-0
5
Ma
r-0
6
Oc
t-0
6
Ap
r-0
7
Pr
ic
e 
($
/g
al
)
Ethanol Unleaded Gasoline
 
Figure 2. Monthly Average Wholesale Prices for Ethanol and Unleaded Gasoline in Omaha, 
Nebraska (January 1997 through May 2007) 
Source: NEO (2007). 
 
 
that the policy is based entirely on futures raises 
the question of why it is needed. Or, why would 
an investor choose insurance rather than cross-
hedging directly using the existing futures and 
options contracts in such a way that mimics the 
margin index? One of the main benefits of the 
insurance approach is the ability to scale coverage 
to each individual investor’s level of exposure 
rather than limiting the risk management ability to 
the size of futures and options contracts. The re-
cent success of the livestock insurance programs 
(LGM and LRP), which are also based on futures, 
implies that there is demand for these types of 
products that are tailored to the buyer (in our case 
an ethanol investor). 
 
 
Premium Determination 
 
A Monte Carlo approach was used to calculate 
the fair premium levels and rates. For this analy-
sis, the margin guarantee was calculated using 
expected prices taken from the first five trading 
days of March as outlined in the previous sec-
tion. Assuming futures market efficiency, we 
generated 5,000 random draws for each of the 
29 commodity prices.5 The means for each price 
distribution were taken as the expected price lev-
els from futures quotes for each contract at their 
trading levels in March. Implied volatilities, ad-
justed for time to maturity, were derived from at-
the-money options quotes for the relevant com-
modity futures contracts over the first five days in 
March. As an illustration of this process, we used 
futures price quotes and implied volatilities from 
March 2007. A summary of the parameterization 
of the price distributions is available from the 
authors upon request. 
                                                                                    
5 There are 5 corn futures contracts traded over any one-year period, 
and 12 futures contracts traded for both gasoline and natural gas, re-
sulting in 29 price distributions. 
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 Each set of 5,000 draws represents a distribu-
tion of commodity price realizations for a spe-
cific contract month during the coverage period 
of the policy. All prices were assumed to follow 
a lognormal distribution. Because the prices 
used in the insurance product are average prices 
over each settlement month, we faced the issue 
that the sum of lognormal random variables is 
not lognormal. The sum, or average, of lognor-
mal random variables has no closed-form prob-
ability density function. Two analytical approxi-
mations have been employed in recent literature, 
using either a lognormal or an inverse gamma 
distribution as an approximation. Turnbull and 
Wakeman (1991) and Levy (1992) have supported 
the use of a lognormal distribution as a good ap-
proximation for volatilities ranging from 10–30 
percent. However, Levy (1997) showed that the 
lognormal approximation does not fare as well 
when volatilities increase beyond 50 percent. For 
this analysis, the lognormal approximation was 
employed for all of the price distributions. 
 
Imposing Correlation 
 
In implementing the Monte Carlo procedure, in-
corporating the correlation among the variables is 
extremely important because it eliminates unreal-
istic price scenarios from the analysis. The target 
correlation structure was taken from the historical 
price data. A method proposed by Iman and 
Conover (1982) was used to impose the historical 
correlation structure.6 The correlations used in the 
procedure are the rank correlations among the 
price variables. The method has recently been 
used in other related studies to design and rate 
livestock revenue insurance (Hart, Babcock, and 
Hayes 2001) and whole-farm insurance (Hart, 
Hayes, and Babcock 2006). 
 
6 Two other methods are commonly used in the literature to impose 
correlation on random draws. Johnson and Tenenbein (1981) outline a 
method where correlation is imposed using a weighted linear combina-
tion of two independent draws. This method is better suited to situa-
tions where the number of marginal distributions is small. The copula 
approach is another alternative which is well known in the financial lit-
erature. The copula method provides an improvement to the Johnson 
and Tenenbein method as it is easily implemented for any number of 
distributions, and it is more flexible than the Iman and Conover (1982) 
method because positive definiteness is not required. Haas (1999) 
shows similar results from using the Iman and Conover and copula 
approaches. For comparison and validation, we use a copula approach 
to calculate fair premiums and rates for the example policy. The rates 
derived from the Iman and Conover and copula approaches differed by 
less than 0.2 percent at all coverage levels. 
 The Iman and Conover (IC) (1982) method is 
fully transparent; the only manipulation to the 
independently generated marginal distributions is 
a resorting of the data based on the Cholesky de-
composition of the target correlation structure. 
Thus, the technique preserves the properties of 
each marginal distribution while changing the re-
lationships among the series. The IC method can 
be used with any marginal distribution and is 
relatively simple in that Cholesky factorization 
and inversion of matrices are the most exotic 
steps used in the procedure. The only limitation to 
the IC method is that the target correlation struc-
ture must be positive definite. 
 The theoretical basis for the procedure is that 
given a random matrix X whose columns have a 
correlation matrix I (the identity matrix) and a 
desired correlation matrix D, there exists a trans-
formation matrix T such that the columns of XT ′ 
(where T ′ is the transpose of T) have a correlation 
matrix equal to D . Since D is positive definite 
and symmetric, there exists a lower triangular 
matrix (the transformation matrix) T such that D = 
TT ′. The IC procedure, given a set of independent 
random marginal draws (X), imposes the ranking 
structure by resorting the draws such that their 
rank correlation matrix equals the desired struc-
ture (D). 
 Historical corn futures settlement prices from 
May 1997 through March 2007 and gasoline and 
natural gas futures price data from April 1997 
through March 2007 were used to calculate the 
historical rank correlations. The difference, in 
percentage terms, of the actual settlement price 
from the expected price levels for each commod-
ity and contract month were calculated for each 
contract year, taking expected and actual settle-
ment prices as defined in the previous section. 
The rank correlation matrix of these percentage 
price deviates were then calculated using Spear-
man’s rho. 
 For the IC method to be employed, the target 
matrix must be positive-definite, a restriction that 
the calculated matrix did not meet. The historical 
rank correlation matrix was modified to create a 
positive-definite matrix that followed the same 
general historical correlation structure. The modi-
fications performed differ by commodity. The 
intertemporal correlations for the corn price de-
viates were left unchanged. The intercommodity 
and intertemporal correlations between the corn, 
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,
unleaded gasoline, and natural gas price deviates 
were set at their respective average values. The 
intertemporal correlations for the unleaded gaso-
line and natural gas price deviates were trans-
formed using a simple linear regression model 
based on the time lag between contracts: 
 
(5) , ,1 *i j i j i jRankCorr Lag= +β + ν . 
 
In equation (5) RankCorri,j denotes the intertem-
poral rank correlation between contracts i and j; 
Lagi,j is the time lag, in months, between con-
tracts i and j ; and νi, j is a mean-zero disturbance. 
 For example, the January and March natural 
gas contracts have a time lag of two months. The 
dependent variable in the estimated model would 
be the value of the calculated correlation between 
January and March natural gas price deviations, 
while the independent variable for that data point 
would equal the time lag of two months. The esti-
mated slope coefficients were negative for both 
models, implying that as the time lag between 
contracts gets larger the correlation decreases. This 
estimated relationship parallels the correlation 
structure in the historical matrix. The coefficient 
estimates, standard errors, and t-statistics for both 
correlation models are summarized in Table 2. 
The actual historical and modified rank correla-
tion matrices are available from the authors upon 
request. 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics for the Rank 
Correlation Regression Models 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable 
∧α  (S.E.) 
∧β  (S.E.) 
Unleaded 
intertemporal 
correlations 
Time lag 
(months) 
1 
(-) 
-0.088 
(0.004) 
Natural gas 
intertemporal 
correlations 
Time lag 
(months) 
1 
(-) 
-0.067 
(0.003) 
 
 
Results 
 
Fair premiums were determined for the 2007 
contract year using the correlated Monte Carlo 
price draws and equation (1) to generate 5,000 
gross margin realizations. The value of the in-
demnity was calculated for each margin realiza-
tion, with fair premiums set equal to the average 
indemnity payment across the draws. The ex-
pected gross margin for ethanol for the 2007 con-
tract year was $1.66 per bushel of corn processed. 
 Table 3 summarizes the estimated fair premi-
ums at various coverage levels. In 2007, policy-
holders would pay $0.376 per bushel for full cov-
erage; this equates to a premium rate of 22.6 per-
cent. Premium levels and rates fall as the level of 
coverage is decreased. At a 65 percent coverage 
level, the gross margin insurance rate was esti-
mated to be 9.4 percent with a $0.10 per bushel 
premium. While these premium rates seem high 
relative to typical crop insurance rates for crops 
grown in the Midwest such as corn and soybeans, 
they are quite comparable to typical insurance 
rates for other crops in higher risk regions. For 
example, rates for yield insurance on cotton in 
many areas of Texas can range from 15–20 per-
cent at the highest coverage levels (85 percent). 
The high premium rates further illustrate the high 
level of volatility implied by market expectations 
in the ethanol industry. 
 The distributions of the uninsured actual gross 
margin and the gross margin when insurance is 
purchased at a coverage level of 75 percent are 
illustrated in Figure 3. The margin insurance 
eliminates a 33 percent chance of the gross mar-
gin index falling below the 75 percent coverage 
guarantee less the fair premium. 
 Sensitivity analysis was conducted on the fair 
premium rates with respect to the expected price 
levels and volatilities. A 20 percent reduction in 
expected price levels results in premium rate re-
ductions of 3–4 percent, with slightly larger rate 
reductions at higher coverage levels. Similarly, 
reducing the annualized price volatilities for all 
commodities and contract months reduces pre-
mium rates at all coverage levels. The magnitude 
of the premium rate reduction is just slightly lar-
ger than the effect of the 20 percent reduction in 
expected price levels for each reported coverage 
level. 
 
Historical Analysis 
 
Margin guarantees, actual margins, and indemnity 
payments were calculated from 1991 through 
2006. Table 4 reports historical expected and ac-
tual gross margins and indemnities at various 
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Table 3. Premiums at Various Coverage Levels 
Coverage Level (percent) Margin Guarantee ($/bu) Premium ($/bu) Rate (percent) 
50 0.83 0.088 6.1 
65 1.08 0.100 9.4 
70 1.16 0.179 10.8 
75 1.25 0.205 12.3 
80 1.33 0.233 14.0 
85 1.41 0.264 15.9 
90 1.50 0.298 17.9 
95 1.58 0.336 20.2 
100 1.66 0.376 22.6 
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Figure 3. Distributions of Uninsured Ethanol Gross Margins and Insured Gross Margins at a 75 
Percent Coverage Level 
 
coverage levels. Indemnities would have been 
paid in 1993, 1995, and 1996. Corn markets were 
highly volatile in 1993, 1995, and 1996. The ex-
pected prices for corn were well below the actual 
settlement levels in all three years. The average 
expected values were $0.16, $0.59, and $0.47 
below the actual average settlement prices for 
1993, 1995, and 1996, respectively. The average 
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Table 4. Historical Margins and Indemnities ($/bushel) 
   Indemnities 
Year Projected Margin Actual Margin 70% 80% 90% 100% 
2006 2.86 2.94 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2005 2.22 2.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2004 0.95 1.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2003 1.11 1.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2002 1.16 1.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2001 0.90 1.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2000 1.28 1.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1999 0.61 1.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1998 0.42 0.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1997 0.58 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1996 0.13 0.02 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.11 
1995 0.81 0.44 0.12 0.20 0.28 0.36 
1994 0.34 0.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1993 1.01 0.66 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 
1992 0.75 1.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1991 0.82 1.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total   0.24 0.44 0.63 0.83 
Note: Margins and indemnities are reported in nominal terms with no time discounting. 
 
 
price of unleaded gasoline settled below expecta-
tions in 1993 by $0.08, further increasing the 
level of the indemnity in that year. In 1995 and 
1996, average unleaded gasoline prices settled 
below expected levels by $0.02 and $0.12, re-
spectively, but these effects were outweighed by 
the higher than expected corn prices in those 
years. 
 On average, the expected price of unleaded 
gasoline was $0.07 (9 percent) lower than the ac-
tual price levels used in contract settlement. The 
expected prices for natural gas also exhibited a 
negative bias of $0.18 (5.2 percent). The expected 
prices for corn were, on average, $0.12 (4.6 per-
cent) higher than the actual prices used in con-
tract settlement. The negative and positive biases 
in the gasoline and corn markets, respectively, 
both caused a decrease in the net value (indem-
nity less premium) of the product. The negative 
bias in the natural gas market would increase the 
value of the product, but the marginal effect of 
changes in natural gas prices on the margin index 
is small relative to the effects of changes in corn 
and gasoline prices. It should be noted that these 
biases were calculated only as averages over the 
historical period analyzed. Futures market bias 
should be virtually eliminated by arbitrage, on 
average, if examined over a longer time interval. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Over the past 15 years, the corn-based ethanol 
industry in the United States has grown at an 
alarming rate, with a significant proportion of the 
investment capital coming directly from corn 
producers. These farmer-owned ethanol facilities 
provide a natural diversification vehicle to farm-
ers similar to livestock production and have led to 
higher corn prices through market creation. How-
ever, investment in ethanol production will also 
increase the investors’ risk exposure to global and 
domestic energy markets. 
 While the CBOT created a futures market for 
denatured ethanol, risk-management opportunities 
in the ethanol industry are still limited. Profit 
margins have been large thanks to government 
support at both the state and federal levels. How-
ever, as the industry continues to expand, corn 
prices are expected to continue to rise while etha-
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nol margins shrink (FAPRI 2007, Elobeid et al. 
2006). Moreover, the continued expansion of the 
industry is expected to lead to increased corn 
price volatility (Hart 2005). Therefore, the need 
for effective risk management tools may become 
increasingly important for the continued success 
of the industry. 
 Currently, a wide variety of insurance products 
are available to agricultural producers to insure 
against yield or price risks in the markets for the 
raw commodities they produce. But, increasingly, 
producer income is based more on the value of 
crops that have been converted into a value-added 
product. However, insurance against declines in 
the value-added portion of the crop is limited to 
just a few policies designed for livestock opera-
tions. 
 This research has outlined the development of 
an insurance product to provide coverage for an 
ethanol gross margin index based on corn, 
unleaded gasoline, and natural gas futures mar-
kets. The product was structured to insure against 
price risks in the markets for corn, DDGS, etha-
nol, and natural gas. The gross margin index and 
fair premiums and rates were calculated on a per 
bushel basis to enable buyers to scale their use of 
the policy based on their ownership share in an 
ethanol facility. 
 The historical correlation structure was im-
posed on the simulated price data using a method 
proposed by Iman and Conover (1982). Monte 
Carlo analysis was used to calculate fair premi-
ums at various coverage levels based on expected 
corn, gasoline, and natural gas prices and implied 
volatilities for 2007. Actuarially fair premium 
rates were estimated to range from 22.6 percent 
of the margin index guarantee at full coverage to 
6.1 percent at a 50 percent coverage level. While 
the estimated fair premium rates are much higher 
than typical unsubsidized rates for crop yield in-
surance for corn and soybeans in the Midwest, 
they are more comparable with rates for insurance 
for other crops and regions, such as cotton in 
many areas of Texas. 
 Historical analysis was carried out to examine 
how the product would have performed had it 
been offered from 1991–2006. The product was 
shown to perform as intended, paying indemnities 
in years when input and output prices deviated 
such that the realized value of the gross margin 
index was below expectations at contract signing. 
Sensitivity analysis was also performed to deter-
mine the effects of price and volatility levels on 
the fair premiums. Premium rates decrease (in-
crease) as price levels and volatilities decrease 
(increase). 
 While a specific contract example was out-
lined, the methodology was shown to be robust 
and flexible to a variety of other policy specifica-
tions. A few contract design alternatives have 
already been mentioned, including varying the 
length of the contract life as well as using the 
energy equivalence approach in calculating the 
ethanol price index from unleaded futures prices. 
A standard option contract would be another way 
of approaching ethanol gross margin coverage, 
where the buyer would choose a strike level for 
the contract rather than a coverage level of the 
expected margin. This would provide buyers 
some flexibility in being able to lock in a given 
margin floor, such as their break-even level, no 
matter what margin levels are expected in any 
given period. 
 The ethanol futures market and its incorpora-
tion into the margin contract also warrants discus-
sion. The biggest obstacles to the direct use of the 
ethanol futures in our example contract were the 
low trading volumes, short trading history, and 
lack of an ethanol options market to reveal price 
volatility. As ethanol futures trading continues, it 
may be easier to identify the relationship between 
ethanol, corn, and natural gas futures. However, 
the price volatility of ethanol would still need to 
be identified, and trading volumes would have to 
increase to a level that would restrict the opportu-
nities for moral hazard. Alternative contract de-
sign and the incorporation of the ethanol futures 
market into the gross margin index are potential 
areas for further research. 
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